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RETRACEMENT AND APPORTIONMENT AS
SURVEYING METHODS FOR RE-ESTABLISHING
PROPERTY CORNERS
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
Conservation and perpetuity of boundary lines is the primary aim
of the law of boundaries. The location upon the ground of such lines
is determined by re-survey, and re-surveys may be classified according
to method.
Retracement is a surveying method for resurrecting evidence of the
location of a once established property corner. Its aim is to follow,
as closely as possible, in the footsteps of the original surveyor and
re-establish property corners in the exact position in which he origi-
nally placed them.' When a retracement fails to uncover satisfactory
evidence of the exact, original location of a property corner, and de-
tects discrepancies of course2 and distance of the original survey as
compared with those derived in the process of retracement, the ap-
plicability of the surveying method of apportionment arises. Appor-
tionment is the method of distributing the excess or deficiency between
two existent corners in such a manner that the amount given to each
increment along the line will bear the same proportion to the whole
difference as the record length of the increment bears to the whole
record distance. It is a method of allocating the deficiency or surplus
in the whole tract to the several parcels which comprise the whole.3
This article will categorize cases of boundary dispute according
to surveying method, and will compare the applicability of the survey-
ing method of retracement to that of apportionment. It will attempt
to explain the general rules and principles of retracement but will not
give a detailed analysis of the legal sufficiency of evidence necessary
for the re-establishment of missing property corners by retracement.
Attempt will, however, be made to explain apportionment, to state the
conditions necessary for its application and to set forth its limitations,
all in relation to and as distinguished from retracement.
II. RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF RETRACEMENT
A. Intention is Paramount in Determining Location
The purpose of a re-survey of land is to locate and mark upon the
ground the boundaries of the parcel of land evidenced by the descrip-
1 CLARK, SURVEYING AND BOUNDARIES, §9-13 (2d ed. 1939).
2 Course is the direction of a line in relation to some known or assumed direc-
tion of a previous line. Id. §6.
3 Id., §174 1 PATTON, TITLES, 158 (2d ed. 1957), 3 Am. LAW OF PROPERTY,
§12.123 (Casner ed. 1952) ; 11 C.J.S. Boundaries. §124, p. 737 (1938) ; 8 AM.
ship. The grantor transferred property by metes and bounds description pur-
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tion given in a particular deed. The legal description fails as a com-
plete protection of the boundaries, however, because it merely describes
what they are and how they are to be determined.4 The extent of the
parcel actually transferred by the deed is resolved by the intention of
the grantor, so far as that intention is effectively expressed in the
deed interpreted in the light of then existing conditions and circum-
stances.5 This presupposes, of course, that the grantor's intention does
not extend beyond the reaches of his own ownership. The expression
of this intention in the deed may be incomplete and ambiguous; but,
regardless of how bunglingly expressed, there is a strong presumption
that the grantor intended a certain encompassing boundary to define
the lands granted. The fact that uncertainties or ambiguities appear in
the legal description does not nullify the rule of intention, but rather
makes its application even more pertinent. Perhaps the most striking
illustration of presumed intention is the "Texas parallelogram" case :6
The plaintiffs contended the deed from their predecessors was void be-
cause the legal description contained a patent ambiguity and did not
describe any encompassing boundary for the lands sought to be trans-
ferred; that, since the ambiguity was patent, no extrinsic evidence was
admissible to cure the defect. The description in controversy read as
follows:
Lying and being situated in Tyler County, said state, on the
waters of Billums creek: Beginning at the S.W. corner of Wil-
liam Pool land; thence east 1,220 varas7 to the Lewis league;
thence south 1,050 varas to the beginning, containing 226 acres,
more or less.
The description commences at a definite, known point, then goes east
for a specified distance; then south a specified distance "to the begin-
ning." Only two boundary lines are described, which, obviously, do
not enclose a particular tract of land. There is no doubt but that the
deed on its face contained a patent ambiguity. But, said the court:
An inspection of the deed shows an obvious omission of two
calls which may be supplied with reasonable certainty. There
are only two lines given in the recorded deed . . . forming a
right angle at the corner. It would suggest itself to a reason-
able mind that the land conveyed is included in the interior
angle, rather than on the exterior. We are certain that more
4 SKELTON, THE LEGAL ELEmENTS OF BOUNDARIES AND ADJACENT PROPERTIES,
§2, 26 (1930).
5 Perry v. Buswell, 113 Maine 399, 94 Atl. 483, 484 (1915). "The cardinal rule
for the interpretation of deeds and other written instruments is the expressed
intention of the parties gathered from all parts of the instrument, giving
each word its due force, and read in the light of existing conditions and
circumstances. It is the intention effectually expressed, and merely surmised.
This rule controls all others."
6 Fortenberry et al v. Cruse et al, (Tex. Civ. App.) 199 S.W. 523 (1917). See
also, 1 PATTON, TITLES, §74 (2d ed. 1957).
7 One vara = thirty-three and one-third inches.
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than one line is omitted, because to draw a line from the point
of beginning to the end of the second line, forming a triangle,
would not give the acreage called for in the deed, giving only
half of the acreage. This right angle triangle, as suggested,
containing only half of the acreage called for, is convincing that
the land conveyed in the deed is in the shape of a parallelogram,
taking the two lines as given, recurring to the beginning point
and running south a distance equal in length to the second line,
and closing this third line by a straight line, and thus construct-
ing a parallelogram containing exactly 226 acres called for in
the deed.
We think the calls of the description in question correct
themselves, and show the land intended to be described, to a
reasonable certainty.8
The intention of the original grantor, as expressed and as inferred
from the deed, is the paramount consideration in determining the lo-
cation of property lines and corners.9
When a deed is interpreted in the light of then existing conditions
and circumstances, the interpreter considers the original survey which
marked the boundaries.10 The highest and best proof of intention lies,
not in the words of expression, but in the work performed upon the
ground itself. Lines actually run and corners actually established upon
the ground prior to the conveyance are the most certain evidence of
intention. "It is by the work as executed upon the ground, not as
projected before execution or represented on a plan afterward, that
actual boundaries are determined.11 The United States Congress recog-
nized and adopted this principle in its enactment of the method of
rectangular division of government lands, "The boundary lines, actu-
ally run and marked in the surveys returned by the Director, shall be
established as the proper boundary lines of the sections or subdivisions
for which they were intended .... -12 When the monuments or marks
8 See Fortenberry et al v. Cruse et al, supra note 6, p. 525.
9 Pike v. Munroe, 36 Maine 309, 58 Am. Dec. 751, 755 (1853); Derham v.
Hill, 57 Colo. 345, 142 Pac. 181, 182 (1914) ; Co-Operative Bldg. Bank v.
Hawkins, 30 R.I. 171, 73 Atl. 617, 621 (1909) ; Parkinson v. McQuaid, 54 Wis.
473, 11 N.W. 682, 684 (1882), citing: Johnson v. Simpson, 36 N.H. 91;
Railroad v. Steleger, 61 N.Y. 348; Jackson v. Dunsbaugh, 1 Johns. Cases 91;
Jackson v. Myers, 3 Johns 388; Church v. Steel, 42 Conn. 69; Wright v.
Day, 33 Wis. 260; Bridge v. Wellington, 1 Mass. 219; Worthington v. Hylyer,
4 Mass. 106; Lane v. Thompson, 43 N.H. 320; Reed v. Proprietors of Locks,
etc., 8 How. (U.S.) 274; Jackson v. Moore, 6 Cow. 706; Drew v. Drew,
8 Foster 495; TYLER, BOUNDARIES, §121; Wolfe v. Scarbarough, 2 Ohio St.
361; Peyton v. Ayers, 2 Md. Ch. 64.
10 Wells v. Lagorio, 112 Va. 522, 71 S.E. 713, 714 (1859), Wisconsin Realty
v. Lull, 177 Wis. 53, 187 N.W. 978 (1922).
11 Oven v. Davidson, 10 U.C.C.P. 302, 310 (1859). Exceptions to the rule as
quoted: It has no application where: 1. the lines were never located and
definitely fixed upon the ground. Nissley v. Moeslein, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 119;(1903) ; 2. the monuments or stakes of the original survey are not referred
to in the deed or on the plat. Warren Powers v. Henry Jackson, 50 Cal.
429 (1875). Long continued acquiesence might render unnecessary a call for
the monument. Wolpert v. Chicago, 280 Ill. 187, 117 N.E. 447, 450 (1917).
12 43 U.S.C. 752 (1946).
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of the original survey are found and they lie wholly within the original
grantor's ownership, 13 the resurvey is complete and the boundaries
conclusively established.' 4
Statement of the principle is simple, but application often diffi-
cult. How does one know that a particular mark or monument found
is the one established by the original survey? If no such monument
is found existing, has its location been preserved? If not preserved,
how may its location be ascertained within a reasonable degree of
accuracy? These are evidentiary questions. The greatest difficulty lies
in accumulating the evidence, weighing it carefully, and analyzing its
import.
Retracement is a process for gathering evidence. It seeks to accumu-
late evidence of intended location of property corners when they have
become lost, obscured, confused or obliterated. The evidentiary suffi-
ciency of a retracement depends upon the observance of accepted prin-
ciples which govern the process.
B. Accepted Principles Governing the Process of Retracement
1. FIRST PRINCIPLE
Location of a Boundary Line is Determined as of the
Time of its Creation
23 Parkinson v. McQuaid, 54 Wis. 473, 11 N.W. 682 (1882), where the stakes
of the original survey did not lie wholly within the original grantor's owner-
ship. The grantor transferred property by metes and bounds description pur-
porting to convey 20 chains of land in an east-west direction. He owned only
20 chains, east-west. The description commenced at the northwest corner of
the northeast one quarter of the northwest one quarter of section 31, which
was on the west boundary of the grantor's property. The original surveyor
established this point of commencement four rods too far west into the ad-
joining property. He then laid out 20 chains to the east of this point and set
stakes on what he thought to be the grantor's east boundary line. Of course,
his stakes fell four rods short of this line. The parcel as staked encroached
by four rods into the property adjoining on the west and was short by four
rods of meeting the grantor's east line.
The grantor, as plaintiff in this action, contended that the parcel as staked
was the land actually conveyed; that he retained ownership in the east four
rods lying between the stakes and his original east boundary.
The grantor's intention was found to be inconsistent with the limits of the
parcel as surveyed and staked. The fact that the plaintiff owned only 20
chains in an east-west direction, and that the deed purported to convey 20
chains, permitted the court to infer that he intended to convey all that he
owned. The court could not conclude that the grantor intended to convey
land he did not own and exclude some which he did own. Since some of the
stakes were not within the grantor's original tract, the rule that lines as
survey and staked determine intention, could not be applied.
The defendant won the suit obtaining a determination that the east four
rods belonged to him.
14 Hall et al v. Tanner, 4 Pa. 244, 45 Am. Dec. 686 (1846); Diehl v. Zanger,
39 Mich. 601 (1878); Tomlinson v. Golden, 157 Iowa 237, 138 N.W. 448
(1912); Gordon v. Booker, 97 Cal. 586, 32 N.W. 593 (1893); Shufeldt v.
Spaulding, 37 Wis. 662 (1875); Lampe v. Kennedy, 56 Wis. 249, 14 N.W. 43
(1882) ; Miner v. Brader, 65 Wis. 537, 27 N.W. 313 (1886) ; Brew v. Nugent,
136 Wis. 336, 117 N.W. 813 (1908) ; Fehrman v. Bissell Lumber Co., 188 Wis.
82, 204 N.W. 582 (1925).
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A boundary line once established should remain fixed in its original
position through any series of mesne conveyances.' 5 A grantee who
purchases the entire extent of particular lands owned by the grantor
determines the boundaries of his purchase as of the time that the par-
ticular parcel was carved out of some larger tract. He takes to the
bounds of the estate of his grantor, who in turn took to the limits of
his grantor's estate, etc., to the time of creation of the boundary. A
grantee purchasing only a part of the lands of his grantor will deter-
mine the common boundaries as of the time of the conveyance, while
he will determine boundaries on the perimeter of the grantor's original
tract with reference to the time that they were created. Each line of the
same parcel must be considered separately, and a determination of the
proper surveying method to be used must be made with respect to each
line of the parcel.
The time of creation principle is closely related to the original
government survey of public lands, since private boundary lines often
run along lines established by this first survey or are described and
located in relation to the original survey corners.
(a) Government Survey as the First Determinant of
Many Locations
A great many title questions are associated with the survey of
"public lands," which are lands that were turned over to the Federal
Government by the Colonial States, or lands that were acquired by
purchase or treaty from the Indians or from foreign powers. Title to
vacant lands within their jurisdiction, not granted to the U.S., was
retained by the Colonial States, the other New England and Atlantic
Coast States (except Florida), and by West Virginia, Kentucky, Ten-
nessee and Texas. In these areas the United States public land laws
are not applicable.' 6 In 1785, the Continental Congress passed an act
inaugurating the rectangular system of division of public lands. The
15Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601, 604-605 (1878). "This litigation grows out of
a new survey recently made by the City Engineer. According to this survey
the practical location of the whole plat is wrong, and all the lines should be
moved four or five feet east.... When an officer proposes thus dogmatically
to unsettle the landmarks of the whole community, it becomes of highest
importance to know what was the basis of his opinion. The record in this
case fails to give an explanation.
Nothing is better understood than that few of our early plats will stand the
test of a careful and accurate survey without disclosing errors. This is true
of the government surveys as of any others, and if all the lines were now
subject to correction on new surveys, the confusion of the lines and titles
that follow would cause consternation in many communities. Indeed the
mischiefs that must follow would be incalcuable, and the visitation of the
surveyor might well be set down as a great public calamity.
But no law can sanction this course. The surveyor has mistaken entirely
the point to which his attention should have been directed. The question is
not how an entirely accurate survey would locate these lots, but how the
original stakes located them."
16 U.S. Bureau of Land Management, Manual of Instructions for the Survey
of Public Lands of the United States, §2 (1947).
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ordinance provided for the division of public lands into townships
six miles square, containing thirty-six sections of one mile square.17
Many subsequent acts were passed modifying and perfecting this basic
system of division, and providing for the administration and disposal
of such lands. The lands (the bulk of lands within the United States)
were actually surveyed and monumented under the authority of the
Surveyor General, and were then sold or granted by the United States
to others. The indicia of ownership of this first sale or grant by the
United States is called a patent. A title search on properties which
were once public lands is ordinarily carried back to this U.S. patent,
and the several tracts are described in relation to the survey and
monuments made and established according to the system of rectangular
division. The monuments set by the original U.S. survey establish
township, section and quarter section lines; and, the method prescribed
by Congress for the division of quarter sections into fractional parts
controls the location of such fractional lines.' s The location of any
boundary line created by Government grant was fixed by the original
survey, and any attempt to relocate such a line must be governed by
the rules for the division of public lands. The retracement should
"follow in the footsteps" of the original surveyor and re-establish
corners and monuments in the exact position upon the ground in which
they were originally established. The location of the line is determined
as of the time of its creation in the position in which it was established
upon the ground by the original surveyor.'9
(b) Senior Conveyance Rule for Determining Location of
Boundary Lines Created by Private Division
A party who conveys an absolute fee interest in particular lands
to one grantee cannot later convey title to the same lands to another.
No title to those particular lands remains in the grantor which he may
convey by the second transaction. 20 Though elementary, this is an
important principle in the relocation of boundary lines where the
lines have been created by successive divisions and conveyances by
the same grantor. The first conveyance by its description, and more
important, by its location upon the ground, fixes the position of the
boundary lines for all time. If the later division and conveyance
should encroach upon the first in any manner, either by description
or by location upon the ground, the rule of prior right of the senior
grantee becomes operative, and the position of the common boundary
between the successive conveyances is determined by considering only
the senior conveyance. 2' "Where there is a dispute of boundaries in
3 Id., Appendix I, p. 460.
18 43 U.S.C. 752, (1946).
19 See supra, note 16, §8.
20 BROWN, BOUNDARY CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES, §3 & 81 (1957).21 Bryant v. Terry, 189 Ky. 489, 225 S.W. 242, 244 (1920).
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two conveyances from the same grantor, the calls of the senior grant
must control, and no language contained in the junior grant can in the
case of conflict extend or change the lines of the elder grant."22
This rule has application, however, only when the divisions, as
well as the conveyances, are successive. For example, we may assume
that the original Government survey made a division of lands in
southeastern Wisconsin at one time and that the land was later sold
in small parcels by successive conveyances. Since the division was
made at one time and all conveyances made later with respect to this
single division, the rule giving the senior grantee prior rights has
no application. The conveyances, only, were successive, not the divisons.
The same limitations hold true with respect to subdivisions where
streets, blocks and lots are carved out of a single tract at one time
and sold off successively at later dates. In a subdivision, the re-survey
of property lines is performed without reference to the chronological
order of the several conveyances, because the whole plan of division
was conceived, organized and defined prior to the first conveyance, and
all lots sold in relation to that plan.23 The senior conveyance rule
might have application only with respect to boundaries on the exterior
of the subdivision, since these lines were created prior to the division
on the tract into streets, blocks and lots.2 4
This rule is but an application of the principle that a boundary line
is determined as of the time of its creation, with the qualification that
"the time of creation" is retroactive to the time when the details of
division became certain.
(c) Adverse Possession in Relation to the "Time of Creation"
Principle
The doctrine of adverse possession does not defile the principle
that location of a boundary line reverts to the time of its creation.
When the disseisor owning adjacent property takes and holds a portion
of his neighbor's lands, he is not extending or expanding the boundaries
of his own property, but rather, is creating an entirely new line
dividing his neighbor's land. The boundary of the disseisor's property
remains in the position fixed at the time of its creation. By holding
22 See Skelton, supra, note 4, §210.
23 O'Brien v. McGrane, 27 Wis. 446, 449 (1871). "We are of the opinion that
it is quite immaterial that the plaintiff was the first purchaser .... of a lot in
such subdivision. The rule for locating lines of the lots is, we think, to be
applied without reference to the order of the several conveyances of such lots."24 See Brown, supra, note 20, §121. "The exterior boundaries of a subdivision
may or may not have senior conveyance considerations, depending upon the
original deed of the subdivided. If the deed defining the boundary of the
subdivision is junior to the adjoiner, then all lots adjoining the senior deed
are junior in character to the adjoiner. Lots within a subdivision may bejunior to an adjoiner of the subdivision, but never to another lot within the




actual, open and notorious, exclusive, hostile and continuous possession
of a part of his neighbor's land for the statutory period, he carves
a new parcel out of the neighboring tract and creates an entirely new
boundary line.
25
This principle then, that the determination of the location of any
boundary line must be made as of the time of its creation, has no
exceptions, and is inescapably involved in every boundary dispute
whether or not it is obviously apparent from the arguments of counsel
or decisions of judges.
2. SECOND PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE PROCESS OF RETRACEMENT
Retracement Should Proceed From a Known Location to
Hypothecate the Unknown
Retracement is the process of uncovering physical evidence of
monuments and corners by intelligent search on the ground for the calls
of the description and field notes of the original survey, guided by
the controlling influence of known points. It should proceed from a
known location to hypothecate the unknown. In public land states,
those in which the land was once under Federal domain, the known
starting point is almost invariably some section or quarter section
corner, accepted and recognized as having been established by the
original Government survey. When such starting point called for by
the legal description is missing, it must first be re-established in its
original position before the retracement may proceed. Such location,
too, is governed by the rules of retracement which are here under
discussion.
26
The retracement, commencing at some known point which was
recognized and accepted by the original survey, is run in accordance
with the plan of the original survey to ascertain the probable position
of each succeeding point. An intensified search for evidence of the
original location of each succeeding point is made in the vicinity
hypothecated by retracement. The search may uncovrer the actual monu-
ment in its undisturbed position, which may be identified by its con-
formity in character to that described in the record (legal description,
field notes and plat or map) and by its physical appearance as mellowed
by age and elements.27 Or, the search may uncover record accessories
or witness marks, which, if not greatly at variance with record ties,
may satisfactorily establish the exact location of the original monu-
ment. Accessories or witness marks to section and quarter section
corners may be such things as bearing trees (trees blazed and marked),
bearing objects, mounds of stone, or pits dug in the sod or soil.2 8
25 See supra, note 1, ch. 24; note 4, ch. VII; note 20, §63-70.
26 See supra, note 16, §348.
- Id., §351.




Accessories to private survey corners may be such things as discs set
in trees or poles, offset pipes or stakes driven into the ground, nails,
tacks or cross-cuts in pavement or sidewalk, or the corner of some
permanent object such as a house or other building. The record may
disclose distances between such accessories and the missing survey
corner. The missing corner may be re-established by intersecting two
or more such known distances.
When there are no remaining traces of the monument (or its
accessories), its location may yet have been preserved. This is known
as an obliterated corner. The point has been perpetuated by collateral
evidence. Its location may be recovered by recourse to the acts and
testimony of interested landowners, competent surveyors, or witnesses
who observed where the corner was originally established. 29 In this
area courts often accept hearsay testimony as matters of public interest
or, in the proper situation, as declarations against interest. 30 A location
that depends solely upon such collateral evidence can be accepted as
the true location, however, only when it bears a proper relation to
known comers and is in substantial agreement with the field notes
regarding distances to natural objects, brush lines, water courses, etc.,
or when the testimony is impeccable. 31
A lost corner is a point of survey whose exact location cannot be
determined to a reasonable certainty either from traces of the original
monument or its accessories, or from acceptable evidence or testimony
that bears upon the original location. Original location can be restored
only by reference to one or more interdependent corners. Restoration
of a corner as lost should not be considered until every other means
of identifying its original position has been exhausted. The legal
description may afford sufficient evidence of the position of the lost
corner if it is not ambiguous and will yield but one location for the
lost corner; and must check our favorably with field measurements
between either known or ascertainable, interdependent corners recog-
nized and accepted by the original survey.-
2
29 Id., §355; see also supra, note 1, ch. 16.
30 CONRAD, MODERN TRIAL EVIDENCE, (1956). See §313, Matters of Public Inter-
est; §515, Vicarious Declarations of Former Owners and Possessors; §788,
The Best Evidence Rule -with particular application to Title, Ownership and
Possession.
3' See supra, note 16, §355. "The testimony of individuals may relate to knowl-
edge of the original monument or the accessories, prior to their destruction,
or to any other marks fixing the locus of the original survey, and the value
of such testimony may be weighed in proportion to its completeness and
agreement with the calls of the field notes of the original survey, also upon
the steps taken to preserve the location of the original marks. All such evi-
dence should be put to the severest possible test by confirmation relating to
known original corners and other calls of the original field notes . . ."
32 Id., §360-361. It should be noted that the primary authority relied upon for
this section was the 'Manual of Instructions for the Survey of Public Lands
of the United States (1947). Although it is not statutory authority for the
restoration of private property lines and corners, its good sense and technical
outline of proper surveying techniques make it an excellent work for general
[Vol. 43
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When the record distance from one such interdependent corner to
another varies substantially with the field measurement obtained in
the re-survey, the surveying method of apportionment may yield the
most probable correct location of the lost corner.
3. THIRD PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE PROCESS OF RETRACEMENT
Retracement Should Apply Rules of Construction to
Contradictory Evidences of Intention
When ambiguities appear in the description, and when discrepancies
arise between adjoining descriptions or between the description and the
physical evidence of the boundaries as it exists on the ground, rules
of construction are applied to determine intention.3 3 The rules, which
are based on reason, experience and observation, and pertain to the
weight of evidence, state the order of preference and relative im-
portance of calls in a grant. This order of priority3 4 is as follows:
(1) Lines actually surveyed and marked prior to the original convey-
ance control over calls for monuments.35
application to private as well as public lands. The Iowa court commended
prototype instructions given by the Surveyor General of Wisconsin and Iowa,
as follows: "We deem the principles contained in the instructions, the true
principles recognized by law in like cases." Moreland v. Page, 2 Clarke
(Iowa) 139, 152 (1855). In cases concerning the subdivision of sections, the
Wisconsin court offers further confirmation of this opinion. Neff v. Paddock,
26 Wis. 546 (1870). Gerhardt v. Swaty, 57 Wis. 24, 14 N.W. 851 (1883).
33 When intention is otherwise obvious, or if it is clear in a particular case that
the order of preference as stated will not best effecuate intention, the rules
should not be applied. Moran v. Lezotte, 54 Mich. 83, 19 N.W. 757, 759
(1884).
34 Outline of the rules is given in City of Racine v. J. I. Case Plow Co., 56 Wis.
539, 14 N.W. 599 (1883).
35 Requirements for the Control of Lines Marked and Surveyed:
(a) Lines must be marked prior to or at the time of the conveyance. Wood-
bury v. Venia, 114 Mich. 251, 72 N.W. 189 (1897).
(b) Lines marked must be adopted by the grantor, either directly, or in-
directly through reference to a plat or map showing them, or by in-
corporating them into deeds. Missouri, K.&T. Ry. Co. of Texas v.
Anderson, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 121, 81 S.W. 781 (1904).
(c) Must be identifiable, otherwise they lack the essential qualifications of
monuments. City of Eldora v. Edgington, 130 Iowa 151, 106 N.W. 503
(1906).
(d) Where they do not agree with course and distance, evidence of their
actual location must be clear and convincing. Albert v. City of Salem
et al, 39 Ore. 466, 65 Pac. 1068 (1901).
EXAMPLE: Stefanick v. Fortona et al, 222 Mass. 83, 109 N.E. 878 (191
One Cohen owned a rectangular parcel of land 198 feet in length along
Mill Street on the west and 66 feet wide along Hoosac Street on the south.
One P. Connors owned land abutting on the east and on the north. Cohen
conveyed a portion of his parcel by the following description:
"Beginning at a point in line between lands of grantor and those of P.
Connors, distant ninety-one (91) feet from a stone monument standing
in the northerly line of Hoosac street, thence in the east line of grantor's
land one hundred and seven (107) feet to the lands of P. Connors; thence
turning at right angle left and running in southerly line of said Connors'
land sixty-six (66) feet to an iron pin driven in the approximate east
line of Mill street; thence turning at an angle of 90 and running one
1960]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
(2) Calls for fixed monuments control over calls for adjoinders.36
(3) Calls for adjoinders control over calls for course and distance.
(4) Calls for course and distance control over calls for quantity.37
The first rule of construction is but an abbreviated phraseology
of the principle discussed previously that the highest and best proof
of intention lies in the work performed upon the ground. A re-survey
should normally apply these accepted rules of construction to contra-
hundred and seven (107) feet in approximate east line of Mill street
to iron pin driven; thence turning left at an angle of 90 and running
sixty-six (66) feet to place of beginning. Meaning to convey the north-
erly part of the Busby lot 107x66."
The point of beginning stated in the deed is 91 feet north of "a stone
monument standing in the northerly line of Hoosac street." The surveyor
measured 91 feet north from the stone monument; then turned a right angle
and measured west 66 feet to the east line of Mill Street, and drove an iron
pin in the ground. Thus, as surveyed, the south line of the parcel conveyed
to Stefanick was 91 feet north of the stone.
After Cohen had conveyed the remaining portion of the 198 foot parcel
to Fortona, it was discovered that the stone monument was actually one and
one-half feet north of the line of Hoosac Street. The distance from the north
line of Hoosac Street to the south line of the Stefanick parcel, as surveyed,
was 92.5 feet, rather than the supposed 91 feet. Stefanick took possession
to the lines as surveyed, and occupied only 105.5 feet, rather than the 107
feet called for by his deed. When the discrepancy was discovered, Stefanick
made claim to the foot and one-half south of the line as surveyed.
The court found in favor of Fortona against Stefanicrk, deciding that the
parcel as surveyed and marked controlled the call for the monument, namely
the north line of Hoosac Street.
Martin v. Carlin, 19 Wis. 454 (1865). Where lines of the original survey
can be run from well ascertained and established monuments, they should
govern, notwithstanding calls in the description for natural objects as bound-
aries, such as a river, the location of which is incorrectly portrayed in the
field notes.
36 Gove v. White, 20 Wis. 425 (1866). Artificial monuments control a call for
distance. Dupont v. Davis, 30 Wis. 170 (1872). Course and distance yield
to fixed monuments and natural objects referred to. Lampe v. Kennedy, 49
Wis. 601, 6 N.W. 311 (1880). Stake referred to in the description controlled
over course and distance. Zuleger v. Zeh, 160 Wis. 600, 150 N.W. 406 (1915).
Where there are no monuments contradicting the measurements on a parcel
of land, and no substantial reason to establish their inaccuracy, course and
distance control.
Considering the problem from a different point of view, mention of ad-joiners could be dropped from the rules of construction. A call for an ad-joiner unequivocally exhibits an intention that the property described extends
only to the line of abutting property called for as an adjoiner. Hence, no
need to apply the rules to construct intention. The problem then, is resolved
to the question: Where is the boundary line of the adjoining property? The
best proof of its location lies in its monumentation and delination upon the
ground. The rules of construction, absent adjoiners, should then be applied
to the description of the adjoining property. Transfer of concentration from
the property primarily concerned, to the property called for as the adjoiner
seems to the author to be the key to the solution. I would omit the last
phrase of the second rule and replace it with the last phrase of the third
rule, making the rules three in number, rather than four.
3s Fortenbury et al v. Cruse et al, see supra, note 6, where the description was
incomplete, a call for quantity played a large part in determining the location
of boundaries. Rioux v. Cormier, 75 Wis. 566, 44 N.W. 654 (1890): Where
it is clear that intention is to convey a certain quantity of land, that inten-
tion is decisive and controlling.
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dictory evidences of intention, absent any circumstances suggesting
their inapplicability.38
C. Summary on Retracement
Intention of the grantor as recited in the deed and as interpreted
with the aid of the rules of construction is the controlling determination
to be made in locating boundaries by re-survey. The highest and best
proof of this intention, ordinarily, lies not in the words of expression
in the deed, but rather, in the work upon the ground itself, where the
survey was made prior to the conveyance. The surveying method of
retracement is applied to locate these points upon the ground. In
conducting the retracement, care should be exercised to retrace the
lines as they were originally run, and not where subsequently and
erroneously re-established by some intermediate owner or holder. The
location of a boundary line must be determined as of the time of its
creation. The retracement should proceed from some known point
recognized and accepted by the original survey to hypothecate the
unknown location of the property comer. When the comer is lost and
cannot be re-established from traces of the original monument of its
accessories, or from acceptable collateral evidence of the original
position, the surveying method of apportionment is considered.39
III. RULES AND PRINCIPLES oF APPORTIONMENT
A. Reason and Necessity for Apportionment
Apportionment is applied when retracement fails to yield sufficient
evidence of the exact location of a lost property comer. The rule has
been stated by the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin sub-
stantially as follows:
When the whole length of the line between ascertained
corners varies from the record length called for, and inter-
mediate property corners are lost, it must be presumed in the
absence of evidence indicating the contrary, that the variance
arose from an imperfect measurement of the whole line. The
variance then is distributed between the several subdivisions
of the whole line in proportion to their respective lengths.40
This definition suggests the reason for the rule: "it must be
presumed in the absence of evidence indicating the contrary that the
variance arose from an imperfect measurement of the whole line."
38 See Skelton supra, note 4, ch. II for a thorough, well organized discussion
of the relative importance of conflicting elements in descriptions.
39 For a review of the principles of retracement and their relationships to ap-
portionment see the leading case of Moreland v. Page, 2 Clarke (Iowa) 139(1855).40 Jones v. Kimble, 19 Wis. 430, 432 (1865). This was an action ocncerned
with the location of a lost quarter comer on the west side of section 2
where there was a deficiency in the length of the west line of the section.
Citing, Moreland v. Page, Id. See also: Brooks v. Stanley, 66 Neb. 826, 92
N.W. 1013 (1902); Miller v. Topeka Land Co., 44 Kan. 354, 24 Pac. 420
(1890) ; O'Brien v. McGrane, 27 Wis. 446 (1871) ; 97 A.L.R. 1227.
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Surveying is not an exact science. The length of the chain or metal
tape used by surveyors for measuring distances varies slightly with
changes in temperature and with tension or pull applied when a
measurement is being made. Slight variations from its one hundred
foot length would cause a substantial error in the measurement of a
line, say, half a mile long. Other factors, such as the force of the
wind, or failure to keep the chain at right angles to the pull of gravity,
cause slight errors substantially constant throughout measurement of
the whole line. Apportionment of variances due to such factors will,
from a mathematical standpoint, yield the correct position of inter-
mediate points along the line.
Where it is discovered that a gross blunder in the original survey
causes the deficiency or surplus, the variance should not be distributed,
but the correction applied at the location where the error was made,
if its position can be determined. However, where small discrepancies
are due to careless surveying and there are no circumstances suggest-
ing the position of the error, the law of probabilities supports the
appointment rule.
Apportionment may be necessary to stabilize the location of inter-
mediate parcels. When the variance occurs between two known corners
recognized and accepted by the original survey, re-establishing the
boundary lines of an intermediate parcel by using the record distance
from one corner will produce a different location for the parcel than
would re-establishment by using the record distance from the other
corner. Stability of location is demanded in the public interest and can,
very often, be obtained only by application of the rule of apportion-
ment.
41
B. Conditions for the Rule to Apply
FIRST CONDITION-Failure of Retracement
As before stated, apportionment is applied only after retracement
fails to discover the location of the original corner. Where tangible




A predominant intention of the divider may justify application
of the rule of apportionment even where no mathematical basis exists.
4 3
41 See Skelton supra, note 4, §216.
42 See PATTON, TITLES, §158, n. 23 (2d ed. 1957). Alos see the section of article
dealing with Rules and Principles of Retracement.
43 Clayton v. Feig, 179 Ill. 534, 54 N.E. 149 (1899) ; McAlpine v. Reicheneker,
27 Kan. 257 (1882). Partition proceedings originated the division; Bennett
v. Simon, 152 Ind. 490, 53 N.E. 649 (1899). Tract divided into two or more
parts of a designated area; Marsh v. Stephenson, 7 Ohio St. 265, 70 Am.
Dec. 72 (1857). Whole tract intended to be conveyed by two or more deeds




The plan of division of the whole tract may indicate the intention
of the grantor to divide it into a specified number of parcels equal
or relative in size. Such an intention might be evident from deeds
describing the several parcels as fractional parts of the whole tract,
or from a plan of division making all parcels equal in size and
therefore relative in dimension with respect to the whole. Such an
intention might easily be presumed when conveyance of the parcels
preceded the actual ground survey and staking. Field work performed
after conveyances made in accordance with some theoretical plan of
division affords no reliable basis for the assumption that the parties
intended to transfer to lines marked and surveyed. Thus, retracement
could uncover only dubious evidence of intention at the time of the
conveyance. Absent retracement as evidence of intention, the legal
description, and map or plat, provide the best evidence of the pre-
dominant intention. The rule of apportionment is applied as a last
resort for distributing discrepancies to determine intention in the
mest equitable way possible.
THnIR CONDITION-Parcels Created Simultaneously
Boundary lines of parcels created successively are determined ac-
cording to the seniority of title doctrine. Any excess or deficiency over
the whole tract is borne by the parcel last to be surveyed. The appor-
tionment rule applies only when the several parcels comprising the
whole tract have been created simultaneously. This does not require
that the conveyances be simultaneous, but rather, that the plan of
division be organized prior to the first conveyance and that the survey-
ing work no each subdivision of the plan be performed at substantially
at the same time.44
C. Limitations Upon Application of the Apportionment Rule
1. THE EFFECT OF AN INTERMEDIATE KNOWN CORNER
An error once located should be placed in the position in which
it originally occurred. An excess or deficiency cannot be prorated
beyond an undisturbed original monument 4 although that monument
is an intermediate corner marking a boundary line between parcels
carved out of the same parent tract. Where there is an excess or
deficiency between known block comers, it should be distributed pro-
portionately among all the lots in the block, but only if no intermediate
44 See O'Brien v. McGrane, supra note 23. See also, 97 A.L.R. 1227, which
states that apportionment is the general rule concerning the rights as between
grantees in severalty of lots or parts of the same tract where measurements
vary from the dimensions given in the record. 97 A.L.R. 1230. Gives as ex-
ceptions to the general rule: (a) where parts are conveyed without reference
to a plan or without anything in the deeds to indicate a purpose to divide in
some definite proportion, and (b) where the tract is divided by separate and
distinct surveys at different times.
45 Lewis v. Prien, 98 Wis. 93, 73 N.W. 654 (1897). A discrepency between one
known monument and another can be apportioned to intervening tracts only.
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lot corners are found existing in their original, undisturbed position.
When one or more original lot corners are found existing, distribution
of excess or deficiency is governed by the known intermediate corner;
apportionment must be performed so as to retain the intermediate
corner in its known, fixed position.4"
The unvarying rule to be following in such a case is to start
at the nearest known point on one side of the lost corner, on
the line on which it was originally established; to then measure
to the nearest known corner on the other side of the same line;
then if the length of the line is in excess of that called for by
the original survey, to divide it between the tracts connecting
two known points, in proportion to the lengths of the boun-
daries of such tracts on such line, as given in the survey .... 47
2. THE EFFECT OF STREETS
Public streets opened in supposed conformity with some plan of
division and long acquiesced in are considered as natural monuments
in themselves, and proportioning should be limited to the blocks between
such streets although the whole length of the line which carries the
discrepancy extends much further. 4 Where streets have acquired a
fixed position by continued use, they limit the apportionment of excess
and deficiency because: (1) it is essential, from a practical viewpoint,
that their location remain undisturbed, as relocation of the traveled
way would entail great expense and cause confusion of boundary lines;
and, (2) the street long used and acquiesced in is some evidence of
original intention-there is a presumption that its present location
commenced with respect to the actual ground location of the boundaries
of abutting properties. 49 When an excess or deficiency exists on a line
extending over several blocks and streets, the streets may serve as
natural monuments indicating the particular portion of excess or defi-
ciency that should be borne by each block. The streets are evidence of
the location of the discrepancy.
No portion of the excess or deficiency should be allocated to the
streets within a tract. This is contrary to the supposition that the
discrepancy was caused by the use of a tape too short or too long, but
46This is an extension of the principle developed previously that lines as
originally surveyed and marked are the best proof of intention. The known
ground location of boundaries of nearby parcels may have an effect upon the
location of the boundaries of the lot or parcel in question. As was said by
the court in Moreland v. Page, see supra, note 39, p. 153: "The second
principle, we understand to be, that all ascertained surrounding monuments
shall have their due weight, in determining the locality of the unascertained,
under the system by which the survey was originally made."4 See Lewis v. Prien, supra note 45, at 93.4sPere Marquette R. Co. v. Graham, 150 Mich. 219, 114 N.W. 58 (1907). Citing:
Van Den Brooks v. Correon, 48 Mich. 283, 12 N.W. 206 (1882). Twogood v.
Hoyt, 42 Mich. 612, 4 N.W. 445 (1880). Hoffman v. Port Huron, 102 Mich.
432, 60 N.W. 831 (1894), also see, supra, note 4, §219.
49 See Skelton, supra note 4, §255, 256.
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predominant intention is deemed to control. Street widths are usually
determined before division into lots is begun, and the widths accepted
as representing the requirements of the municipality which sets the
class of streets. The divider has a tendency to keep street dimensions
as small as possible, so it is reasonable to assume that he gave much
thought to such widths, intending them as shown. Had he known of
any deficiency he would have allocated it to the abutting blocks. 0
Treating streets as natural monuments controlling the distribution
of a discrepancy is not without its problems. The traveled way may be
well defined but the right-of-way lines unsettled. It is, for instance,
normal to center a twenty-eight foot pavement within a sixty foot
right of way. It may be naive to presume that even a paved way with
a well defined centerline was constructed in the exact center of the
right-of-way throughout its entire length; but, at least, this is a
reasonable presumption which should prevail in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary. Other improvements, such as fences or build-
ings, set by owners along the right-of-way, constructed according to
the stakes of the original survey and maintained for a number of
years, are competent evidence to prove the location of streets. 1
3. THE EFFEcT OF IMPROVEMENTS
Apportionment is applied when there is a discrepancy between
the record and measured distances between two known corners. Prop-
erty improvements such as fences, buildings, driveways, curbs, side-
walks and earth grading, maintenance and occupation may be evidence
of the location of the discrepancy. Once an error is located, there is no
logical basis for distributing it beyond the location in which it occurred.
Since the surveyor's function is to re-locate property comers in the
exact position upon the ground where established by the first surveyor,
when it is ascertained that existing improvements were made soon
after the original lines were established and in conformance thereto,
these improvements become evidentiary of the original location of the
property lines and corners.5 2 But, "practical location or use and occu-
pation to be evidentiary of original location must be at least open
50 Id., §219.
51Village of Galesville v. Parker, 107 Wis. 365, 366, 83 N.W. 646 (1900); City
of Racine v. J. I. Case Plow Co., 56 Wis. 539, 14 N.W. 539 (1883); City of
Racine v. Emerson, 85 Wis. 80, 55 N.W. 117 (1893); City of Madison v.
M ayers, 97 Wis. 399, 73 N.W. 43, 40 L.R.A. 635 (1897).
52 City of Racine v. Emerson, 85 Wis. 80, 55 N.W. 117 (1893). For a history
of previous Wisconsin decisions concerning practical location (occupation
and improvements) and its effect upon apportionment. City of Madison v.
Mayers, 97 Wis. 399, 73 N.W. 43, 40 L.R.A. 635 (1897); Gilman v. Brown,
115 Wis. 1, 91 N.W. 227 (1902); Smith v. City of Beloit, 122 Wis. 396, 100
N.W. 877 (1904); Lawler v. Brennan, 150 Wis. 115, 134 N.W. 154, 136 N.W.
1158 (1912); Wunnike v. Dedrich, 160 Wis. 462, 152 N.W. 139 (1915);
Hillside Cotton Mills v. Bartley, 156 Ga. 271, 119 S.E. 404 (1923) ; Brewster
v. Buloy, 296 S.W. 372 (Mo. 1927).
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to the inference that it commenced with some reference to the original
survey lines or markings. ' 5
3
The evidentiary value of improvements depends upon the proba-
bility that their builders had, at the time of construction, a better
means of knowing where the original lines were located than is now
available. This probability increases with the quantity of concordant
evidence presented. 54 If the shortage or surplus occurred between two
known block corners, evidence of improvements on only one of the
lots would carry little weight bearing upon original length of the lot
lines. But improvements on many of the lots, bearing a uniform rela-
tionship to the plat or plan of division, would effectively rebut the
argument that the improvements were made either with no relation to
the original lot lines or erroneously in relation thereto. The effect of
the error could be segregated and borne by the lot or lots across which
it originally occurred.55
4. THE EFFECT OF AN END RUN
Where a conflict arises between record and measured distances and
all subdivisions of the parent tract are given definite, precise dimen-
sions, it is difficult to apply the rule giving control to intention as
effectively expressed in the map or plat; since the subdivider evidently
anticipated no excess or deficiency. There is some basis, however, for
inferring that he anticipated future discovery of some unknown, pres-
ent error when: (1) all lots but one in the block are uniformly dimen-
sioned and the one is given the remaining odd difference between the
overall block dimension and the sum of the uniformly dimensioned
lots, and (2) all lots are dimensioned except one which is left either
completely undimensioned or qualifiedly dimensioned with a "more
or less" figure. The odd-dimensioned or undimensioned lot invariably
occurs at the end of a block. Existence of such an end remnant might
indicate that the divider realized the possibility of a discrepancy and
provided for its allocation by intending that it be borne by the end,
irregularly dimensioned lot.
Where all lots are definitely dimensioned, but one which is ir-
regclarly in shape or proportion, a few jurisdictions recognize this
as sufficient evidence that the subdivider intended any discrepancy to
be borne by the irregular lot. The theory was developed in Barrett v.
Perkins.56
One side of a block contained twenty-two lots. The first twenty-
one lots were rectangular in shape and twenty-five feet wide at the
front; lot twenty-two was triangular in shape having a record dimen-
53 Pereles v. Gross, 126 Wis. 122, 130, 105 N.W. 217 (1905).
54 Id. at 131.
55 For the effect of fences see 170 A.L.R. 1144.
56 113 Minn. 480, 130 N.W. 67 (1911).
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sion of 75.38 feet across the front. A surveyor attempted to relocate
the boundary line between lots eighteen and nineteen by laying-off the
record distances from the block corner at the end of lot twenty-two.
This method was found to be in conflict with improvements on other
lots and failed to account for a deficiency which actually existed in
the overall block dimension. The appellate court held that the survey
was in error because it failed to take proper account of the deficiency.
The court recognized the rule requiring apportionment of excess and
deficiency but held that it did not apply in this case. The court stated,
"the owner of the plat must be deemed to have intended to constitute
the irregular remnant a lot by itself, regardless of its dimensions, and
a purchaser thereof takes the whole remnant, whether of greater or
less area than that indicated on the plat," and that the irregular lot,
"cannot be enlarged at the expense of the owners of the other lots,
nor, if of greater area than shown by the plat, diminished in their
favor."57
This rationale is rejected by the majority of courts deciding the
issue, who do not on such little evidence infer an overriding intention
of the subdivider to throw an excess or deficiency into one irregularly
shaped or dimensioned lot.5 8 Similar cases have proceeded to the same
decision, without creating an additional limitation on the apportionment
rule, by applying the rules regarding the control of streets and plats
as monuments, and by giving weight to improvements and occupation
as evidence of original location of boundary lines.59 In the case of
Mechler v. Dehn0 0 the New York Supreme Court applied the rule as
laid down in the Barrett case; but, the Appellate Division specifically
rejected the Barrett rule:
I do not believe that this rule is sound principle. A party who
maps a plot of land into lots, whether regular or irregular, in
size, and gives them certain dimensions on the map, believed by
him to be accurate, cannot, in my opinion, be held by any such
strained construction to intend the irregular lots as a remnant,
regardless of its dimensions. On the contrary, I think he be-
lieves and intends that each lot shown on the map, regular or
irregular, has, or should have, the dimensions ascribed to it.61
Where one lot in a block or row of lots is left undimensioned or
qualifiedly dimensioned with a "more or less" indication, there is
substantial basis for inferring that the developer intended this lot to
carry any surplus or shortage. -In the case of an undimensioned lot,
not only is the assumption of intention strong, but application of the
57 Barrett v. Perkins, 113 Minn. 480, 130 N.W. 67, 69 (1911).
58 Quinnin v. Reimers, 46 Mich. 605, 10 N.W. 35 (1881); Pereles v. Magoon,
78 Wis. 27, 46 N.W. 1047, 23 Am. St. 389 (1890); Cited approvingly in 6
THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY 3391 (Perm. ed.).
59 Goldsmith v. Fillman, 33 Pa. Super Ct. 44 ( ), see Skelton, note 4, §223.60 203 App. Div. 128, 196 N.Y.S. 460 (1922).
61 Id. at 463.
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apportionment rule becomes impractical. To apportion a discrepancy
among several lots it is necessary to know the frontage of each lot,
and where one lot is undimensioned it is impossible from a mathe-
matical standpoint to apply the apportionment rule. What proportion
of the discrepancy should the undimensioned lot bear when one of the
factors of the proportion is an unknown? Because of the strong evi-
dence of intention and of the impracticability of proration, an un-
dimensioned lot, or one conditionally dimensioned should bear all of
the surplus or shortage in the block when retracement, properly per-
formed, does not yield the original location of property lines.
62
5. EXTENT OF THE PARENT PARCEL
Proportioning excess or deficiency among a group of parcels cannot
be extended beyond the reaches of the parent tract. The apportion-
ment rule stating, "When the whole length of the line between ascer-
tained corners varies from the record length called for . . .", refers
to the corners of the parent tract. Efforts to relocate the boundary
lines of one parcel may sometimes include tracing the ancestry of that
parcel through several prior divisions. A separate determination must
be made of the proper surveying method to be applied, retracement
or apportionment, with respect to each step on the family tree. Ap-
portioning may be done only between corners utilized by the original
surveyor in making that particular division.
6 3
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The intention of the grantor is paramount in determining the loca-
tion of boundary lines of any particular conveyance. The best proof
of that intention lies in the work performed upon the ground, and re-
tracement is the method for gathering evidence of property lines as
located upon the ground. Re-survey, or retracement, should proceed
upon the principle that a boundary line once established must remain
fixed in its original position ad infinitum, and should gather evidence
bearing upon original location only, disregarding subsequent, errone-
ous attempts at retracement. Lines established by prior division and
conveyance cannot be altered by subsequent conveyances encroaching
upon the prior. Retracement begins at some known point which was
recognized and accepted by the original survey. It proceeds with the
aid of the deed, plat or map, and field notes of the original survey,
to hypothecate each succeeding survey point and gather evidence of its
62 Baldwin v. Shannon, 43 N.J.L. 596 (1881), where the report of the decision
is ambiguous as to whether all lots in the block were undimensioned or
whether a notation on the plat called for a specified dimension of twenty-five
feet on all regular lots. It is the authors interpretation that the plat called
for the twenty-five foot dimension. Entire deficiency was borne by the two
end, fractional lots which were undimensioned. Toudouze v. Keller, (Tex.
Civ. App.), 118 S.W. 185 (1909); Pereles v. Gross, 126 Wis. 122, 105 N.W.
217, 110 Am. St. 901 (1905).
63 See Clark, supra note 1, 195; 6 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §3391 (Perm. ed.).
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original location. When physical and corroborative evidence is insuf-
ficent to establish the exact location of the original corner, resort must
be had to other interdependent corners found existing. When field
measurement between known or ascertainable, interdependent corners
varies materially from the record distance, the apportionment rule,
with its many ramifications, becomes operative.
The proportionment of surplus or shortage over the whole line
among the many units comprising the whole is the practical effect
of the realization that surveying is the art of measurement and not
an exact science. Changes in nature generally as well as in human
nature preclude exact duplication of original measurements, and in-
significant unit differences soon accumulate to substantial discrepan-
cies. This practical realization, or some sufficiently expressed intention
of the grantor, may indicate that proportionment closely approximates
the original work and distributes the excess or deficiency as equitably
as possible. The limitations on the surveying method of apportionment
are but particular instances of the applicability of the surveying method
of retracement. In the final analysis, apportionment is but a rule of
last resort; it is applied only in absence of any markings upon the
ground of the division lines between parcels carved out of the same
tract.
V. RECENT DEcisioN
After completion of the foregoing comment, there was handed down
by the Wisconsin court a decision 4 dealing directly with the principles
of apportionment discussed in this paper, and providing an excellent
illustration of the problems which can be encountered in applying
those principles. This addendum will therefore attempt to relate the
case to the foregoing discussion.
The case involved a boundary dispute arising out of a surplus in
one block of a platted subdivision. (See the attached figure for a pic-
torial representation of the block and its division into lots.) The divi-
sion was made and the plat recorded in 1892. The plaintiffs were
owners of lot 23 and the defendants owners of lot 24. The total
record distance from northwest to northeast comers of the block is
1218.30 feet; the actual measured distance between monuments exist-
ing at the respective corners is 1219.72 feet. Subtraction of the record
distance from the measured one produces the amount of surplus, 1.42
feet. To these facts both parties agreed.
The plaintiffs, owners of lot 23, contended that the surplus should
be distributed among all lots in the block, so as to locate the east line
of lot 23 only a fraction of an inch over the record distance from the
northeast corner of the block, 45.96 feet plus the small portion of




surplus they would allocate to lot 24. The defendants contended that
the entire surplus should be thrown into lot 24, and the boundary
between lots 23 and 24 located 45.96 feet plus 1.42, or 47.38, feet from
the northeast corner of the block.
Upon trial the defendants produced the original drawing of the
subdivision from which the recorded plat was made. Lot dimensions
shown thereon in black ink corresponded exactly with dimensions
shown on the recorded plat. But just beneath the figure 45.96 on the
original drawing, along the front line of lot 24, the figure 47.38 ap-
peared in red ink. Field notes of the original surveyor were also
produced indicating a change of the dimension from 45.96 to 47.38.
Neither the drawing nor the field notes were dated, and the original
surveyor was deceased. The drawing and field notes were authenticated
by affidavit of the son of the original surveyor, who had worked with
his father until 1915, when the father retired from business. The
affidavit was received under stipulation and stated that the figures in
red ink on the original drawing were in the handwriting of the original
surveyor, also that the affiant did not know when the figures were
written. Since the physical condition of the drawing indicated its an-
tiquity, and since it was found in the possession of the successor in
business of the original surveyor, a natural and proper place for its
custody, the drawing was admitted into evidence under the ancient
document rule.
The defendants, by testimony of a surveyor, showed that improve-
ments and occupation lines (fences, hedges and other physical evi-
dence) between various lots in the block corresponded with record
distances from the northwest corner of the block. He found crosses
chipped in the sidewalk on the side lot line extensions which cor-
responded with record dimensions as measured from the northwest
corner of the block. He found a fence along the west line of lot 23
which was located, almost exactly, in the same position as shown on
the recorded plat when measured from the west.
The defendants argued that the original surveyor intended to
place the excess in lot 24 rather than distribute it among all lots in
the block. The trial court sustained the defendants' position upon
the following findings:
(1) that the stone monuments at the northeast and northwest corners
of the block marked the original location of the block corners;
(2) that an overage of 1.42 feet existed along the north line of the
block;
(3) that the original surveyor intended to place the overage in lot 24,
such intention being inferred from the evidence that the original
drawing showed the figure 47.38 in red ink written in the handwriting
of the original surveyor;
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(4) that all lots in the block with the exception of lots 1 and 24
were of even dimensions, supporting the inference that it was the
intention to give even dimensioned lots the exact frontage called for,
and distribute any deficiency or surplus in the odd dimensioned end
remnants;
(5) that since most lot owners made improvements according to record
distances as measured from the northwest corner of the block, it
would be impossible to apply the apportionment rules-its application
would involve changes in many occupational lines.
The Supreme Court challenged the validity and completeness of
the inference drawn from the red ink figures shown on the original
drawing, that the intention of the original surveyor and subdivider
was to place the entire overage in lot 24. Said the appellate court:
We cannot agree with the trial court that the exhibit sup-
ports an inference that the surveyor effectively placed the over-
age in lot 24. There is no testimony that the subdivider ever
knew of the mistake in the measurement. Any inference as to
the intention of the original subdivider is based upon the infer-
ence as to the intention of the surveyor. When we speak of
subdivider we refer to the owner of the tract that was sub-
divided. If the mistake had been discovered in 1892 or soon
thereafter and had been called to the attention of the subdivider,
the matter of the overage could have been settled very easily
at that time. 65
Upon this determination the Supreme Court reversed the judgment.
The Supreme Court accepted apportionment as a general rule when
variance occurs between record and measured distances in a block of
a platted subdivision, and denied that the facts of this case presented
an exception. Application of the rule was, however, modified,
Because of the time element involved, because the lots are im-
proved and occupied, and because of evidence of the establish-
ment of the boundaries up to the division between lots 23 and
24, a strict application of the apportionment rule would be in-
equitable . . . we can only apply the apportionment rule as be-
tween the parties to this action, alloting one-half of the overage
to the plaintiffs and the remaining half to the defendants.
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The case emphasizes the importance of the principle that it is the
intention of the owner or grantor which controls the location of boun-
dary lines, and not the intention of the surveyor. It is what the sur-
veyor actually and effectively does, not what he intends to do, that
forms the vital connecting link between field location of boundaries
and the intention of the grantor. The appellate court, however, con-
sidered that the only evidence bearing upon what the surveyor actually





The case only remotely recognizes the possibility that the surveying
method of retracement might be involved in its facts. The appellate
court, applying apportionment as a general rule establishing the true
location of boundary lines, considered evidence of improvements and
occupation, however consistent with record dimensions, as bearing
upon establishment of lines only by adverse possession or by agree-
ment. Neither counsel, trial court, nor appellate court mentioned any
possible relationship between occupational lines and the original ground
location of boundaries.
The decision cites Pereles v. Magoon6 7 as the leading Wisconsin
case on appointment. The Pereles decision cited approvingly McAl-
pine v. Reicheneker,68 and quoted therefrom:
if no monuments were set, except theoretically on paper, the
proper location of these monuments will be determined by pro-
rating the distances as given in the records, according to the
length of frontage of the several allotments.6 9 (emphasis sup-
plied)
The Pereles case decided that no inference of intention that end
remnants bear all surplus or deficiency could be drawn from the
mere fact that end lots were odd dimensioned and intermediate ones
even; but it did not decide, nor intimate, that the apportionment rule
would prevail over satisfactory evidence of original ground location
of boundary lines. Cited also in the Pereles case were: Westphal v.
Schultz,7 0 which concerned the location of a one-sixteenth corner of a
section (such corners were not established by the original government
survey); O'Brien v. McGrane'1 where controversy arose between the
seniority of title doctrine and the apportionment rule as applied be-
tween lots of the same subdivision (available evidence located block
corners only); Jones v. Kimble72 which concerned the location of a
quarter-section corner of a fractional section (no evidence as to
original field location was presented). The great weight of authority
in Wisconsin and elsewhere limits application of the apportionment
rule to those situations where intermediate corners were not located
on the ground prior to conveyances by the original subdivider and
common grantor, and to those situations where the original ground
location of intermediate corners is lost and cannot be ascertained by
satisfactory evidence bearing upon the original location.
It is this author's firm conviction that from evidence presented,
and from other evidence easily obtainable,7 3 the inference could readily
67 78 Wis. 27, 46 N.W. 1047 (1890).
68 27 Kan. 257.
69 Id. 264 (1882).
7048 Wis. 75, 4 N.W. 136 (1879).
7127 Wis. 446 (1871).
7219 Wis. 429 (1865).
73Public tax records would devulge the approximate year during which improve-
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be drawn in the principal case that the original surveyor surveyed and
staked all of the lots in the block prior to any conveyance by the
subdivider, and that the location of boundary lines as surveyed and
staked has been preserved. If these propositions can be sustained by
the evidence, then it follows that the location of such lines as ascer-
tained should be deemed the true lines, and apportionment would have
no application to the case.
Only block corners, not intermediate lot corners, were marked
prior to recording the plat in 1892. This conclusion is deducible
from the face of the plat. The plat indicates that stakes were placed
at each of the four block corners. The surveyor's certificate thereon
recites that it was surveyed, divided and mapped in accordance with
the requirements of Chapter 101 of the Revised Statutes. Chapter 101,
Section 2260 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, required block corners
to be marked on the ground, and Section 2261 required that all monu-
ments erected in the field be represented on the plat offered for record.
Assuming compliance with the law, intermediate lot corners were not
staked prior to recording. No conveyances were made of the lots in
block 8 until 1910, and the east seventeen lots were conveyed before
1915; the west seven lots were transferred between the years 1919
and 1922.74 Since purchasers ordinarily demand to see the product
before buying, it seems reasonable to assume that all lots in the block
were staked shortly before the first sale in 1910. Since it was proven
that the red ink figures shown on the original drawing were in the
handwriting of the original surveyor, and that he retired from busi-
ness in 1915, it does not seem unlikely that he discovered the surplus
at the time the lots were staked in the supposed 1910 survey, and
placed the entire surplus in lot 24 by driving a stake in the ground
at the northwest corner of such lot, 47.38 feet from the northeast
corner of the block.
It was shown upon trial that improvements and occupation on most
of the lots in the block were in substantial agreement with record
dimensions as measured from the northwest corner of the block. This
condition existed up to the west line of lot 23, where a fence agreed,
almost exactly, with record distance from the west. This seems to
establish that the lots were staked according to a plan of division
using record distances from the west. In Moreland v. Page,5 the only
ments were made on the several properties. Records of the zoning depart-
ment and building inspector might well contain original surveys of the indi-
vidual lots showing where the surveyor actually and effectively located the
boundaries, and might disclose the relationship of improvements and occupa-
tion to the lines as surveyed and marked upon the ground.
7 This information was obtained by the author's search of records in the
register of deeds office.
752 Clarke (Iowa) 139 (1855).
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authority cited in Jones v. Kimble7 6 and cited as a leading case in
Westphal v. Schult,7 7 it was stated:
unknown corners must be found by the corroborative testi-
mony of all, with as little departure as may be from the system
adopted on the original survey, without giving any preponderam:e
to the testimony of any one monument above another. In doing
this, courses and distances, which are elements of superficial
ineasure, must yield to the facts, namely, the established monu-
ments. In other words, to use a homely adage, the several gar-
ments must be cut according to the cloth ... all ascertained sur-
rounding monuments shall have their due weight in determining
the locality of the unascertained, under the system by which the
survey was originally made."'
When shown that the lot lines were staked up to the west line of lot
23 measuring from the west, the system of the survey is established
and should be extended to include the last interior lot line in the block.
By this method the surplus is effectively allocated to lot 24 by re-
tracement of the original survey.
Admittedly, evidence is thin that the intermediate lot corners were
actually staked prior to the first conveyance in the block. But there is
Wisconsin authority to the effect that long continued occupation is,
itself, prima facie evidence of the original ground location of boundary
lines:
If there be no original monuments in existence, but it appears
that there has been occupation and that fences have been main-
tained for many years, it will be assumed that the lines of such
occupation agree with original occupation taken in accordance
with the original survey soon after it was made while the stakes
or monuments were in existence."
Establishing lot lines in accordance with even slight evidence by
retracement seems superior to establishment by arbitration-giving one-
half of the disputed area to each litigant. Certainly, a concerted effort
76 Supra, note 67.
r Supra, note 70.
75 Supra, note 75, p. 152.
79Lawler v. Brennan, 150 Wis. 115, 141, 134 N.W. 154, 136 N.W. 1058 (1912).
See also Thiel v. Damrau, 268 Wis. 76, 66 N.W. 2d 747 (1954), where a
boundary line as surveyed and staked was held to prevail over record dimen-
sions shown on a plat; the location of the line as surveyed and marked was
preserved by a fence which had been constructed at a time when the original
stakes were in existence. For an apparent conflict see, Shimmel v. Dundon,
1 Wis. 2d 98, 83 N.W. 2d 143 (1956), where the line as surveyed and staked
was held not to control over course and distance stated in the deeds. The court
distinguished the case from the Thiel decision on the grounds that the Thiel
rule applied only to divisions described by lot and block, whereas this case
dwelt with a division by metes and bounds description. The author finds it
difficult to understand the practical basis upon which this distinction is
founded.
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should be made to establish lines as they were originally surveyed and
marked before the surveyor, or the court, should undertake to set an
entirely new boundary line by application of a variant of the appor-
tionment rule, when evident in a particular case that the reasons upon
which the rule is based do not exist.
RORERT J. GRIFFIN
